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THE FUTURE OF COMPANY TAXATION 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
 
Comments by Professor Peter Birch Sørensen 
on the speech given by EU Tax Commissioner Frits Bolkestein 
at the conference on 'Tax Policy in the European Union' 
in Rotterdam, 18 October 2001 
 
 
It is exciting that we are gathered for this conference just as the European Commission is about to 
publish its long-awaited study on the future of company taxation in the EU. I am sure we all 
appreciate that Commissioner Bolkestein gives us this opportunity to learn about the contents of the 
new report. 
 
Before I turn to the issue of company taxation, let me say that the Commissioner is undoubtedly 
well in line with academic opinion and sentiments in Member States when he says that there is no 
need for harmonisation of personal income taxes within the European Union. I also agree with the 
Commissioner that there is indeed a need for some coordination of capital income taxes. It is 
encouraging to note the Commissioner's confidence that Member States will not hesitate to adopt 
the proposed 'Savings' Directive which aims at improved exchange of information to ensure 
effective taxation of foreign interest income. Adoption of this Directive should raise economic 
efficiency by securing equal tax treatment of foreign-source and domestic-source income from 
savings. But more importantly, effective enforcement of taxes on foreign savings income will 
stengthen the legitimacy of  the European tax order by demonstrating to the ordinary voter that the 
liberalization of capital flows within our Community was not carried out in order to facilitate tax 
evasion, but in order to raise the productivity of the European economy. 
 
The most interesting part of Commissioner Bolkestein's speech dealt with the new Commission 
report on company taxation. According to the Commissioner the new study reveals substantial 
variation in effective corporate tax rates across Member States. It also shows that most of this 
variation can be traced to differences in statutory corporate tax rates. Despite this finding the 
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Commissioner seems very much opposed to a harmonisation of corporate tax rates, whereas he 
appears to be more positive towards some kind of harmonisation of the corporate tax base. In the 
rest of this comment, I will concentrate on this issue of company taxation in Europe. 
 
The basic issue is: should corporation taxes be harmonised at all? And if so, how  far should 
harmonisation go? At the moment, multinationals have to deal with 15 different company tax 
systems within the EU, and their choice of  investment location within the Union can have very 
important tax implications. There is considerable evidence from academic research that these tax 
differentials affect corporate location decisions, even though taxes are of course only one of several 
factors determining the choice of location. To my mind, the large variation in the tax treatment of 
corporations is incompatible with the idea of a single market offering a level playing field for 
business competition. Because the level of corporation tax depends on the location of  investment - 
and not on the shareholders’ place of residence - the existing corporate tax differentials imply that 
corporate capital may flow to the countries offering the lowest effective tax rates, and not to the 
countries where capital can be most productively employed. 
  
The Commissioner mentioned four different blueprints for comprehensive company tax reform 
aimed at removing tax obstacles to the efficient functioning of the Single Market: 1) Home State 
Taxation, 2) A Consolidated Common Tax Base, 3) A European Union Corporate Income Tax 
administered at the EU level, and 4) A Compulsory Harmonised Tax Base. The first three systems 
would be an optional choice for EU multinational companies, whereas the fourth system would be 
mandatory for all corporations in the Union, including those with only domestic operations. These 
ideas for company tax reform have already been discussed in the European tax policy debate for a 
while, and this enables me to offer some comments on them. 
 
A common feature of the four systems mentioned above is that they all eliminate the current 
practice of separate accounting based on the arm’s length principle for individual entities within a 
mulitinational group. Instead, European multinationals will be allowed or required to calculate their 
EU-wide profits under a single, consolidated tax base. As a substitute for separate accounting, a 
common formula would then be used to apportion profits to Member States for taxation. All four 
systems assume that Member States will maintain their right to choose their own tax rate on their 
apportioned share of the EU-wide profits of a multinational group of companies. 
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It is highly interesting that the well-known problems of transfer pricing and thin capitalization under 
separate accounting have now motivated the Commission to seriously consider the alternative of 
formula apportionment which has long been advocated by many academics. The use of formula 
apportionment raises a number of difficult issues such as the problems of defining a group of related 
companies to be subject to formula apportionment; specifying the factors in the formula, and 
separating the EU tax base from corporate income from non-EU sources. This is not the place to 
discuss such technical issues. Let me just briefly state the main advantages and disadvantages of the 
four different company tax systems, as I see them: 
 
The system of Home State Taxation implies that EU multinationals would be allowed to calculate 
the consolidated profits on their EU-wide activities according to the tax code of their Home State, 
that is, the Member State where their headquarters are located. A German-based multinational 
would calculate its EU profits on the basis of German tax rules; a multinational group 
headquartered in France would calculate its total taxable EU-wide profits in accordance with French 
tax law, etc. From the perspective of national policy makers, the main advantage of Home State 
Taxation is that it does not require any harmonisation. All that is needed is that participating 
Member States mutually recognize the company tax systems of the other countries participating in 
the system. For tax administrators the elimination of separate accounting should make life easier by 
eliminating the need to enforce complex transfer pricing rules for transactions within the EU. From 
the perspective of the business community, one attractive feature of Home State Taxation is that the 
system is optional: no company will be forced to switch to the system, but those that make the 
switch are likely to experience lower tax compliance costs, since they will no longer have to adhere 
to the different and sometimes conflicting national rules for the setting of transfer prices. Switching 
to a consolidated tax base will also enable companies to offset losses on operations in one Member 
State against profits made in another Member State, and corporate restructuring within a 
consolidated group will meet with fewer tax obstacles.  
 
At the same time the attractive flexibility of Home State Taxation is also the main weakness of the 
system, since the existing differences across national tax systems will continue to create distortions. 
Apart from the fact that national differences in statutory corporate tax rates will remain, members of 
different multinational groups operating in any given EU country will be subject to different tax 
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base rules if their parent companies are headquartered in different Member States. Further, and 
perhaps more important, Home State Taxation will invite Member States to compete by offering 
generous tax base rules in order to attract corporate headqarters. Such competition would create 
negative revenue spillovers, since a more narrow tax base definition in any given Home State would 
apply not only to income from activity in the Home State, but to income earned throughout the EU 
area. Hence it is very difficult to imagine that Home State Taxation could be viable in the long run 
if the system is not complemented by some common minimum rules regarding the acceptable 
definition of the tax base. 
 
In contrast to Home State Taxation, the Consolidated Common Tax Base acknowledges the need for 
a harmonised set of rules defining the tax base for those companies opting for consolidation of their 
EU-wide profits. This will eliminate tax base competition for corporate headquarters and will create 
a more level playing field for European multinationals. Of course, the price to be paid for these 
advantages is the loss of national autonomy implied by tax base harmonisation. Moreover, the fact 
that the harmonised base would apply only to multinationals could create distortions between large 
and small firms operating within each Member State, since the small firms without international 
operations would still be subject to the domestic tax rules. It would also be a clear disadvantage that 
each national tax administration would have to deal with two different tax systems, that is, the new 
Consolidated Common Tax Base applying to multinationals, and the existing national tax rules 
relevant for domestic firms. 
 
The same comments apply to the European Union Company Tax which is economically equivalent 
to the Consolidated Common Tax Base except that the latter system is supposed to be administered 
by national governments, whereas the European Union Company Tax is supposed to be 
administered at the EU level, with some or all of the revenue accruing directly to the EU. 
 
I propose that comprehensive company tax reform in the EU should be guided by two basic 
principles: First, tax administration and tax compliance should be simplified for all the parties 
involved, that is for governments as well as for companies. Secondly, company tax reform should 
strive to create a level playing field for all firms, domestic as well as international. On the basis of 
these two principles, I prefer the fourth alternative in the Commission report, the so-called 
Compulsory Harmonised Corporation Tax. This system implies that a single corporate tax base 
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would apply for all firms in all member states. Indeed, I would go even further and argue for a 
harmonised corporate tax rate as well. 
 
In matters of EU tax coordination, the challenge is to strike a balance between the desire to create a 
smoothly functioning internal market - which tends to call for tax harmonisation - and the desire of 
Member States to preserve a reasonable degree of national autonomy in tax policy. I suggest that a 
fair compromise between these legitimate goals could consist of a fully harmonised corporation tax 
combined with effective exchange of information enabling EU Member States to enforce residence-
based personal taxes on income from capital, as intended by the proposed Savings Directive. A 
fully harmonised corporate tax base would secure all of the gains from tax base consolidation 
mentioned above. Rate harmonisation seems justified by the finding of the Commission study that 
the bulk of the cross-country variation in effective corporate tax rates is caused by the current 
variation in statutory tax rates. A harmonised corporation tax with a consolidated tax base would of 
course require formula apportionment of corporate tax revenues across Member States. 
 
In the current era of euro-scepticism it may seem quite radical to propose a harmonisation of the 
rates as well as the base of corporation tax. However, it is crucial to keep in mind that the 
distribution of the tax burden across taxpayers depends on the total tax burden on income from 
capital. Apart from the corporation tax, this burden also includes personal taxes on income and 
wealth. An effective exchange of information among national tax administrations within the EU 
would improve the ability of Member States to enforce personal taxes on the interest and dividends 
paid out by the corporate sector, as well as personal taxes on capital gains on shares. In the current 
regime with hardly any exchange of information, the potential for capital flight to foreign bank 
accounts which cannot be monitored seriously constrains the ability of individual Member States to 
impose taxes on income from mobile portfolio capital. By improving the ability of governments to 
tax foreign source income, information exchange will strengthen national tax autonomy, making it 
easier for each Member State to choose its own preferred level of personal taxes on capital income. 
If they obtain more room of maneuver in the field of personal income taxation, EU Member States 
should be more willing to give up autonomy in the area of corporate taxation to eliminate the many 
distortions to the Single Market created by the current corporate tax differentials.  
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The point is that the corporation tax is really just a withholding tax, serving as a prepayment of the 
final taxes on the capital income originating from the corporate sector. The final tax burden is 
determined by the personal taxes levied on interest, dividends and capital gains, and these taxes will 
remain under the control of Member State governments even if the corporation tax were 
harmonised. If a Member State finds that the harmonised corporation tax implies an inappropriately 
low level of tax on corporate-source equity income, it can rectify the situation by adding personal 
taxes on dividends and capital gains at the shareholder level. If it finds that the harmonised 
corporation tax is too high, it can use part of its apportioned corporate tax revenue to finance tax 
credits to shareholders. 
  
It might be objected that since the corporation tax serves as a ’backstop’ for the personal income 
tax, ensuring that shareholders cannot accumulate funds within the corporate sector free of tax, 
countries with relatively high levels of personal income tax will also want to impose relatively high 
levels of corporation tax, and vice versa. However, in practice there is no systematic link between 
corporate and personal tax rates in the EU. For example, Denmark imposes a top marginal personal 
income tax rate of almost 60 percent, but her corporate tax rate is only 30 percent. By contrast, Italy 
has a corporate tax rate of 37 percent, even though she only levies a top personal tax rate of 46 
percent. Hence the ’backstop’ function of the corporation tax is hardly a serious argument against 
EU corporate tax harmonisation. This conclusion is strengthened once one considers that 
governments can supplement the corporation tax on retained earnings by a personal tax on capital 
gains on shares. 
 
A more serious objection to my suggested combination of corporate tax harmonisation and 
residence-based personal taxation determined by Member States is that residence-based taxes may 
be undermined by the possibility of capital flight from the EU area if important third countries 
refuse to cooperate on information exchange. This is indeed a serious concern, although the OECD 
is making sustained efforts to induce the tax havens of the world to adopt a more cooperative 
attitude. We have reason to hope that the tragic events of September 11 this year will pave the way 
for more international cooperation. Gradually it will become clear to a critical mass of countries that 
the rules of bank secrecy enacted many years ago under very different historical circumstances are 
no longer appropriate, if we want to ensure a safe and stable environment for legal transactions by 
households and firms in today’s globalized economy. 
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Let me come to my conclusion: the new Commission report on company taxation will give a 
welcome boost to the European tax policy debate. As Commissioner Bolkestein has indicated, the 
report contains pragmatic proposals for piecemeal reforms aimed at the short run, and more 
ambitious reform options for the longer run. As I have tried to make clear, I believe that full 
corporate tax harmonisation is still a legitimate long term goal for EU tax policy and will become 
more pressing as economic integration deepens. 
 
Nevertheless, it makes sense to proceed in steps. A harmonisation of corporate tax rates is a highly 
visible and hence rather controversial form of tax coordination. For the short and medium run, it 
may be better to focus on a reduction of the costs of tax compliance and tax administration via a 
harmonisation of the corporate tax base. Once this is achieved, the process of tax competition via 
statutory corporate tax rates will become more transparent. Member States imposing aggressively 
low statutory rates will no longer be able to claim that the higher rates levied by other countries are 
offset by special provisions and deductions etc. The greater transparency in tax competition is likely 
to create more political pressure for a floor to corporate tax rates, as it becomes clear that corporate 
tax competition is essentially a zero sum game. Hence the next step could be the adoption by 
Member States of a binding minimum statutory corporate tax rate, applied to the common base. In 
parallel, the EU will hopefully be able to gradually establish an effective exchange of information 
among tax authorities, supported by cooperation with important third countries, as intended by the 
Savings Directive. If we can achieve this, the improved enforcement of residence-based taxation 
and the resulting strengthening of national tax autonomy will justify the third and final step which 
would be a complete harmonisation of the corporate income tax, in accordance with the logic of the 
Single Market. 
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